Re: [CVE] [URGENT] Squid v19.2.6 and Tentacle v20.2.4 released
Hi Eugen Ah yes, of course. You are absolutely right. I missed those when I was cleaning up obsolete keys. Deleting them has removed the error. Thanks for that lightning-fast help! Regards, Chris On 24/08/2026 12:16, Eugen Block wrote:
Hi Chris,
"detail": [ { "message": "entity mds.c1 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity mds.c2 using insecure key type: aes" }
those two auth entries are most likely from before your cephadm upgrade, assuming you adopted this cluster with cephadm. They are most likely not in use by any daemons as you can see in your current daemon list:
Deploying daemon mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv on c1 Deploying daemon mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl on c2
Before cephadm, MDS daemons didn't have any suffixes, so those must be your old MDS daemons from before cephadm-
I would recommend to double check, but you can probably just delete those two old auth entries:
ceph auth del mds.c1 ceph auth del mds.c2
Just to be safe you can export those keyrings as a backup in case you actually do experience trouble after deleting those entries.
Regards, Eugen
Zitat von Chris Palmer <ceph-users@ceph.io>:
I'm upgrading a test cluster (cephadm, 20.2.3 -> 20.2.4). The upgrade completed successfully, but the MDS processes (1 active, 1 standby) still show as using the aes service key (AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE). I have manually issued a reconfig and restarted each daemon but no difference.
Output of "ceph -W cephadm" (with the probably irrelevant stuff snipped out):
2026-08-24T11:03:16.341923+0100 mgr.c3.lythrw [INF] Upgrade: Started with target quay.io/ceph/ceph:v20.2.4 2026-08-24T11:03:17.171731+0100 mgr.c3.lythrw [INF] Upgrade: First pull of quay.io/ceph/ceph:v20.2.4 2026-08-24T11:03:35.480918+0100 mgr.c3.lythrw [INF] Upgrade: Target is version 20.2.4 (tentacle) 2026-08-24T11:03:35.480946+0100 mgr.c3.lythrw [INF] Upgrade: Target container is quay.io/ceph/ceph@sha256:09ee90f6f3e0c7b9954f71d214ee05e9bbaaaea3716b1dd619603283b829f8b8, digests ['quay.io/ceph/ceph@sha256:09ee90f6f3e0c7b9954f71d214ee05e9bbaaaea3716b1dd619603283b829f8b8', 'quay.io/ceph/ceph@sha256:6bb1c8a42fbc0bf87938946990b65174466997bc11c31eb5a323225a779fd8f9']
2026-08-24T11:03:35.482902+0100 mgr.c3.lythrw [INF] Upgrade: Need to upgrade myself (mgr.c3.lythrw) 2026-08-24T11:03:36.195045+0100 mgr.c3.lythrw [INF] Upgrade: Updating mgr.c1.hsiqod 2026-08-24T11:03:36.250599+0100 mgr.c3.lythrw [INF] Deploying daemon mgr.c1.hsiqod on c1 [snip]
2026-08-24T11:08:16.388893+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Upgrade: It appears safe to stop mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv 2026-08-24T11:08:17.180069+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Upgrade: Updating mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv 2026-08-24T11:08:17.217174+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Deploying daemon mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv on c1 2026-08-24T11:08:24.528567+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:08:24.534395+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Upgrade: It appears safe to stop mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl 2026-08-24T11:08:25.420651+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Upgrade: Updating mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl 2026-08-24T11:08:25.486295+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Deploying daemon mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl on c2 [snip]
2026-08-24T11:11:16.759649+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Rotating keyring for mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv 2026-08-24T11:11:16.786643+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Redeploying mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv with new keyring 2026-08-24T11:11:16.787629+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Deploying daemon mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv on c1 2026-08-24T11:11:26.030560+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Rotating keyring for mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl 2026-08-24T11:11:26.076154+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Redeploying mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl with new keyring 2026-08-24T11:11:26.076957+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Deploying daemon mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl on c2 2026-08-24T11:11:35.278324+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Upgrade: checking if all mon, mgr, OSD, mds daemons upgraded before changing service cipher 2026-08-24T11:11:35.447319+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Unmuting AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_ALLOWED warning as upgrade is completed or has been stopped 2026-08-24T11:11:36.529431+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Unmuting AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_CREATABLE warning as upgrade is completed or has been stopped 2026-08-24T11:11:37.580675+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Unmuting AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_TICKETS warning as upgrade is completed or has been stopped 2026-08-24T11:11:38.673337+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Unmuting AUTH_INSECURE_CLIENT_KEY_TYPE warning as upgrade is completed or has been stopped 2026-08-24T11:11:39.743724+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Unmuting AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE warning as upgrade is completed or has been stopped 2026-08-24T11:11:40.873968+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Unmuting AUTH_INSECURE_ROTATING_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE warning as upgrade is completed or has been stopped 2026-08-24T11:11:41.937998+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Upgrade: Complete! 2026-08-24T11:11:44.155457+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mon.c1 (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:44.155490+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mon.c1 (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:44.156559+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring daemon mon.c1 on c1 2026-08-24T11:11:45.052365+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mgr.c1.hsiqod (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:45.052389+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mgr.c1.hsiqod (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:45.053849+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring daemon mgr.c1.hsiqod on c1 2026-08-24T11:11:45.886112+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mon.c2 (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:45.886156+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mon.c2 (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:45.887368+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring daemon mon.c2 on c2 2026-08-24T11:11:46.725430+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mon.c3 (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:46.725461+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring mon.c3 (monmap changed)... 2026-08-24T11:11:46.726439+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring daemon mon.c3 on c3
At this point nothing more happens. But:
root@c3:~# ceph health detail --format=json|jq . { "status": "HEALTH_ERR", "checks": { "AUTH_INSECURE_CLIENT_KEY_TYPE": { "severity": "HEALTH_WARN", "summary": { "message": "19 auth client entities with insecure key types", "count": 19 }, "detail": [ { "message": "entity client.admin using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.block-physical using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.bootstrap-mds using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.bootstrap-mgr using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.bootstrap-osd using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.bootstrap-rbd using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.bootstrap-rbd-mirror using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.bootstrap-rgw using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.ceph-exporter.c1 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.ceph-exporter.c2 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.ceph-exporter.c3 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.crash.c1 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.crash.c2 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.crash.c3 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.rgw. using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.rgw.c1 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.rgw.c2 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.rgw.rgw.c1.kevxdx using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity client.rgw.rgw.c2.fndzzj using insecure key type: aes" } ], "muted": false }, "AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_ALLOWED": { "severity": "HEALTH_WARN", "summary": { "message": "Monitors are configured to allow auth using insecure key types", "count": 1 }, "detail": [ { "message": "insecure cipher aes allowed for auth" } ], "muted": false }, "AUTH_INSECURE_KEYS_CREATABLE": { "severity": "HEALTH_WARN", "summary": { "message": "Monitors are configured to allow creation of insecure key types", "count": 1 }, "detail": [], "muted": false }, "AUTH_INSECURE_ROTATING_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE": { "severity": "HEALTH_WARN", "summary": { "message": "4 rotating auth service keys using insecure key types", "count": 4 }, "detail": [ { "message": "rotating service keys for mon using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "rotating service keys for mds using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "rotating service keys for osd using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "rotating service keys for mgr using insecure key type: aes" } ], "muted": false }, "AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE": { "severity": "HEALTH_ERR", "summary": { "message": "2 auth service entities with insecure key types", "count": 2 }, "detail": [ { "message": "entity mds.c1 using insecure key type: aes" }, { "message": "entity mds.c2 using insecure key type: aes" } ], "muted": false }, "OSDMAP_FLAGS": { "severity": "HEALTH_WARN", "summary": { "message": "noout,norebalance flag(s) set", "count": 17 }, "detail": [], "muted": false } }, "mutes": [] }
root@c3:~# ceph orch reconfig mds.cephfs Scheduled to reconfig mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv on host 'c1' Scheduled to reconfig mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl on host 'c2' 2026-08-24T11:33:27.362951+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfig service mds.cephfs 2026-08-24T11:33:27.561183+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring daemon mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv on c1 2026-08-24T11:33:28.448509+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Reconfiguring daemon mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl on c2
root@c3:~# ceph orch daemon restart mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl Scheduled to restart mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl on host 'c2' root@c3:~# ceph orch daemon restart mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv Scheduled to restart mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv on host 'c1' 2026-08-24T11:34:33.571897+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Schedule restart daemon mds.cephfs.c2.lpzncl 2026-08-24T11:41:40.075162+0100 mgr.c1.hsiqod [INF] Schedule restart daemon mds.cephfs.c1.secoxv
But the HEALTH_ERR : AUTH_INSECURE_SERVICE_KEY_TYPE error persists.
root@c3:~# ceph -s cluster: id: 90573d1e-7825-58a3-b34a-2890a7f53cea health: HEALTH_ERR 19 auth client entities with insecure key types Monitors are configured to allow auth using insecure key types Monitors are configured to allow creation of insecure key types 4 rotating auth service keys using insecure key types 2 auth service entities with insecure key types noout,norebalance flag(s) set
services: mon: 3 daemons, quorum c1,c2,c3 (age 75s) [leader: c1] mgr: c1.hsiqod(active, since 54m), standbys: c3.lythrw mds: 1/1 daemons up, 1 standby osd: 12 osds: 12 up (since 69s), 12 in (since 7M) flags noout,norebalance,noautoscale rgw: 2 daemons active (2 hosts, 1 zones)
data: volumes: 1/1 healthy pools: 14 pools, 249 pgs objects: 322 objects, 35 MiB usage: 180 GiB used, 750 GiB / 930 GiB avail pgs: 249 active+clean
io: client: 85 B/s rd, 0 op/s rd, 0 op/s wr
root@c3:~# ceph fs status cephfs - 0 clients ====== RANK STATE MDS ACTIVITY DNS INOS DIRS CAPS 0 active cephfs.c1.secoxv Reqs: 0 /s 12 15 13 0 POOL TYPE USED AVAIL cephfsmeta metadata 3161k 37.9G cephfsdata data 14.3k 148G STANDBY MDS cephfs.c2.lpzncl MDS version: ceph version 20.2.4 (7f793731f1b39eb4f465e960113d2363c311b964) tentacle (stable - RelWithDebInfo)
What should I do from here?
Thanks, Chris
On 19/08/2026 17:07, Patrick Donnelly wrote:
Today, August 19th, 2026, the Ceph project has released Tentacle 20.2.4 and Squid 19.2.6 hotfixes for four CVEs across several components.
This is the sixth backport release in the Squid series.
This is the fourth backport release in the Tentacle series.
Additional details will be posted on the Ceph website/blog: https://ceph.io/en/news/blog/
We strongly recommend that all Ceph operators upgrade to one of these releases as soon as possible.
## Critical Upgrade Steps
The fix for CVE-2025-30156 introduces a new CephX key type, aes256k. This is the first time Ceph has introduced a new key type for CephX credentials. Therefore, a new procedure exists for upgrading and rotating Ceph daemon keys as part of this CVE. Before upgrading a Ceph cluster, the operator should familiarize themselves with the procedure documented at:
https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/rados/configuration/auth-config-ref/index.ht...
These steps are for package-based deployments of Ceph. In other sections, the document also includes new information about key rotation procedures, monitor authentication controls, and emergency recovery procedures.
Deployments using cephadm will automate the process except for client keys. You may notice that Cephadm spends more time than normal on the upgrade after updating all daemon images. This is due to a new process rotating the OSD and MDS keys. Please be patient. There are plans to improve this in the future.
Deployments using Rook will also automate rotation of some client keys with some exclusions. Look to the Rook project’s announcement for more details.
Client and kernel upgrades are recommended to support aes256k. Note that upstream Linux kernel client support began in kernel 7.0 and has been backported to CentOS Stream 9 and 10. Check with your distribution vendor for backported key support before rotating client keys used by the kernel.
As part of upgrading a Ceph cluster, six new health warnings and errors will be generated. This is normal. As part of the process to upgrade/rotate entity keys, you will address the warnings and errors as you go. These are documented beginning here:
https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/rados/operations/health-checks/index.html#au...
The CephX documentation has been brought up to date and vetted for accuracy. Those changes are live here:
https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/architecture/index.html#high-availability-au...
Regarding the fix for CVE-2026-54330, RGW will now reject Sigv4 requests with `host` and `x-amz-` headers not included in the signed subset. Unfortunately, the REST client used in multisite was generating such improperly signed requests.
If you are running multisite, you must set the ``rgw_sigv4_insecure`` option to true before you begin to upgrade. After all clusters are upgraded, set the option to ``false`` again.
Regarding the fix for CVE-2026-50152, formal guidance on rotating all secrets stored in the Monitor config-key store will be forthcoming. In the meantime, operators of cephadm-managed clusters are strongly encouraged to rotate the cephadm SSH key, as an established process exists:
See: https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/cephadm/host-management/#ssh-configuration
Rotating other secrets is advised but the process is not yet established. Operators should assess their cluster's potential exposure to determine if immediate Monitor config-key secret rotation is required for their environment.
## CVE Fixes
* CVE-2025-30156 is an authentication bypass in CephX caused by misuse of AES-CBC.
See: https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/security/CVE-2025-30156
* CVE-2026-39944 shares the unauthenticated-encryption root cause of CVE-2025-30156, but applies it to RGW's STS session tokens resulting in improper verification of a cryptographic signature.
See: https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/security/CVE-2026-39944
* CVE-2026-50152 is an improper authorization flaw in the Ceph Monitor subscription handler.
See: https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/security/CVE-2026-50152
* CVE-2026-54330 is a flaw in RGW not properly verifying its SigV4 cryptographic signatures in RGW's SigV4 verifier.
See: https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/security/CVE-2026-54330
## Other Media
A Cephalocon 2025 talk covers some of the details surrounding the new CephX key upgrade process.
https://cephalocon2025.sched.com/event/27f2O/rotating-heads-and-cephx-keys-p...
## Getting Ceph ------------ * Source at https://github.com/ceph/ceph * v19.2.6 Tarball at https://download.ceph.com/tarballs/ceph-19.2.6.tar.gz * v20.2.4 Tarball at https://download.ceph.com/tarballs/ceph-20.2.4.tar.gz * Containers at https://quay.io/repository/ceph/ceph * For packages, see https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/install/get-packages/ * For upgrade with cephadm, see: https://docs.ceph.com/en/latest/cephadm/upgrade/ * v19.2.6 Release git sha1: f9fd95b4335bad6a26d7a74468f55d269e8dbef4 * v20.2.4 Release git sha1: 7f793731f1b39eb4f465e960113d2363c311b964
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Chris Palmer