Hi Cephers, Due to the escalating situation in which leaked secrets from a previously compromised GH Action (tj-actions) [1] are used to compromise more popular GH Actions (reviewdog)[2], *we have decided to immediately disable all Github Actions in all repositories, except the official GH ones, and the ones under the Ceph organization*. *From a preliminary analysis, none of our repos has been impacted*. However, given that the Ceph org hosts more that 200 repositories (including forks), it's safer to take a conservative approach while a deeper analysis is undertaken (and the situation settles down). We know that this might have an immediate impact on Ceph teams, as it will break CI using unofficial Github Actions. The recommendation for *each team is to review their Github workflows in their repos* (.github/workflows/*.yaml) and ensure that: - *Version tag pinning is replaced with the corresponding SHA-1 hash*, even for GH official actions. Example <https://github.com/ceph/ceph/blob/8890c0f0df343897195ab97104be0a551d899361/.github/workflows/pr-triage.yml#L12> . - Once the previous requirement is met, *GH Actions from unofficial sources can be requested* (via mail to security@ceph.io) to be included in the allow-list. - Except for actions from the "reviewdog" org <https://github.com/reviewdog>: their team is still analyzing the scope of the attack. In this case, we shouldn't yet trust SHA-1 hashes obtained after the attack until the analysis concludes. - Alternatively, in the long run, we are considering to start forking 3rd party GH Actions under the Ceph org, but carries extra overhead for the Ceph maintainers. We apologize for the inconvenience, but we did this to reduce the exposure of the Ceph community to a series of attacks that may continue to escalate. Kind Regards, Ernesto [1] https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/harden-runner-detection-tj-actions-changed-... [2] https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/reviewdog-github-actions-are-compromised